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Abstract 
Is the patent length an effective policy instrument in stimulating R&D? This paper develops a 
generalized variety-expanding growth model and then calibrates the model to the aggregate data of the 
US economy to analyze the effects of extending the patent length. The numerical exercise suggests that at 
the empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads 
to only a very small increase in R&D despite R&D underinvestment in the market economy. On the other 
hand, shortening the patent length can lead to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. This 
paper also makes use of the dynamic general-equilibrium framework to examine the fraction of total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth that is driven by R&D, and the calibration exercise suggests that about 
35% to 45% of the long-run TFP growth in the US is driven by R&D. Finally, this paper identifies and 
analytically derives a dynamic distortion of the patent length on saving and investment in physical capital 
that has been neglected by previous studies, which consequently underestimate the distortionary effects of 
patent protection.  
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1. Introduction 
Is the patent length an effective policy instrument in stimulating R&D? The statutory term of patent in the 
United States (US) was 17 years from 1861 to 1995 and then extended to 20 years as a result of the 
TRIPS agreement. Suppose that there is underinvestment in R&D in the market economy as suggested by 
Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000), why hasn’t the term of patent been lengthened to stimulate R&D?1 
Especially, Kwan and Lai (2003) show in a variety-expanding growth model that extending the effective 
lifetime of patents would lead to a substantial increase in R&D and consequently welfare gains.  
 This paper attempts to provide an answer to the above questions by developing a generalized 
variety-expanding growth model and calibrating the model to the aggregate data of the US economy to 
analyze the effects of extending the patent length. It turns out that whether an extension in the patent 
length would lead to a significant increase in R&D depends crucially on whether the model is calibrated 
properly to match the empirical patent-value depreciation rate. The numerical exercise suggests that at the 
empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to 
only a very small increase in R&D despite R&D underinvestment in the market economy. On the other 
hand, shortening the patent length can lead to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. In other 
words, the patent length loses its effectiveness in stimulating R&D at around 20 years. This paper also 
makes use of the dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) framework to examine the fraction of total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth that is driven by R&D. The calibration exercise suggests that about 35% to 
45% of the long-run TFP growth in the US is driven by R&D. Finally, this paper identifies and 
analytically derives a dynamic distortion of the patent length on saving and investment in physical capital 
that has been neglected by previous studies, which consequently underestimate the distortionary effects of 
patent protection. The dynamic distortion arises because when the patent length increases, the fraction of 
monopolistic industries goes up. The resulting higher aggregate markup causes the wedge between the 
                                                 
1
 The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), initiated in the 1986-94 
Uruguay Round, extends the statutory term of patent in the US from 17 years (counting from the issue date when a 
patent is granted) to 20 years (counting from the earliest claimed filing date) to conform with the international 
standard. Because of the difference in the starting date, the effective extension of patent length was much shorter 
than 3 years. 
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marginal product of capital and the rental price to increase. As a result, the market equilibrium rate of 
investment in physical capital decreases and deviates further from the social optimum. 
 This paper relates to a number of studies on R&D underinvestment. In a companion paper, Chu 
(2007) numerically evaluates the effect of blocking patents on R&D in a generalized quality-ladder 
growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights, and he finds that eliminating blocking patents 
can be very effective in stimulating R&D. In performing a similar quantitative analysis, Chu (2007) and 
the current paper together provide a quantitative assessment on the relative effectiveness of extending the 
patent length and eliminating blocking patents in solving the R&D-underinvestment problem suggested 
by Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000). The crucial difference arises because extending the patent 
length affects future monopolistic profits while eliminating blocking patents affects current monopolistic 
profits. Furthermore, the calibration exercise takes into consideration Comin’s (2004) critique. Comin 
(2004) argues two points: (a) Jones and Williams’ (2000) finding of R&D underinvestment is based on 
the assumption in their calibration that the long-run TFP growth is solely driven by R&D; and (b) the 
level of R&D spending in the data may be optimal if R&D only drives a small fraction of the long-run 
TFP growth. The current paper contributes to this debate by bringing in an additional moment that is the 
patent-value depreciation rate in order to calibrate the fraction of long-run TFP growth driven by R&D, 
and the details will be discussed in Section 2.9.  
 This paper also complements the theoretical studies in the patent-design literature that is mostly 
based on a partial-equilibrium setting by providing a quantitative DGE analysis on patent policy. The 
seminal work on patent length is Nordhaus (1969), and he concludes that the optimal patent length should 
balance between the static distortionary effects of markup pricing and the gains from enhanced 
innovations. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) argue that given the choices of patent length and patent breadth 
as policy instruments, the socially optimal policy combination is an infinite patent length and a minimum 
degree of patent breadth.2 In a DGE setting, Judd (1985) also concludes that the optimal patent length is 
                                                 
2
 Some other studies on optimal patent design include Tandon (1982), Klemperer (1990), Green and Scotchmer 
(1995), O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue, Schotchmer and Thisse (1998), Hunt (1999) and Schotchmer (2004).  
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infinite.3 On the other hand, Futagami and Iwaisako (2003) show that the optimal patent length may be 
finite when there is no underinvestment in R&D. However, the above studies do not feature endogenous 
capital accumulation so that the dynamic distortion on capital accumulation is absent.  
 In terms of quantitative analysis, the most closely related work is Kwan and Lai (2003), and they 
find substantial welfare gains from extending the effective lifetime of patent. There is an important reason 
for the contradicting results between Kwan and Lai (2003) and the current paper. By using the same final-
goods production function as in Romer (1990), Kwan and Lai (2003) necessarily restrict the size of the 
markup to the inverse of the capital share. This setup restricts the balanced-growth rate of monopolistic 
profits captured by each patent to equal the population growth rate that is nonnegative. Relaxing this 
parameter restriction indicates that at the empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates estimated by 
previous studies, the implied growth rates of the number of varieties (that are no longer the same as the 
TFP growth rate) are very high; consequently, the share of monopolistic profits captured by each patent 
declines sharply overtime rendering patent extension ineffective in stimulating R&D. In other words, the 
potentially rapid decline in the market share captured by each patent due to the introduction of new 
varieties enables the model to feature the empirically observed depreciation in the market value of 
patents. As a result, extending the patent length has limited effects on R&D. 
 Before closing the introduction, I briefly survey the empirical literature on estimating the market 
value of patents using patent renewal data to gather some information about the magnitude of the rate at 
which a patent’s value declines overtime.4 The pioneering study that estimates a deterministic patent 
renewal model is Pakes and Schankerman (1984), and they find that the market value of patents 
depreciates at a rate of 25% per year with a 95 percent confidence interval of 18%-36%. Schankerman 
and Pakes (1986) provide more recent data on a number of European countries, in which about half of all 
patents are not renewed within 10 years and only 10% of them are renewed until the end of the statutory 
                                                 
3
 Some other DGE studies on patent policy include Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), O’Donoghue and Zweimuller 
(2004) and Grossman and Lai (2004). However, all of these studies neglect the dynamic distortion on capital 
accumulation and are qualitatively oriented. Chu (2007) provides a more detailed discussion on these studies.  
4
 For a more detailed survey on early studies, see e.g. Griliches (1990). 
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term.5 Pakes (1986) develops a stochastic renewal model to capture the effect of learning about a patent’s 
value in the initial years, and he also finds high rates of depreciation ranging from 11.4% in Germany to 
19.0% in the United Kingdom. Lanjouw (1998) uses a more general stochastic renewal model to estimate 
the value of patents in a number of industries. In addition to the rates of depreciation, her model also 
estimates the annual probability that a patent becomes obsolete (i.e. complete depreciation), and it ranges 
from 7% for computer patents to 12% for engine patents. Although the empirical estimates tend to vary 
across studies, across countries and across industries, there seems to be suggestive evidence that the rates 
of depreciation and obsolescence are quite high for patents.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and derives the 
dynamic distortionary effect of the patent length. Section 3 calibrates the model to the data, and the final 
section concludes with some important caveats. All proofs are contained in Appendix I.  
 
2. The Model 
The variety-expanding model is a generalized version of Romer (1990). The basic framework is modified 
to introduce a finite patent length denoted by T for each invented variety of intermediate goods. The final 
goods are produced with labor and a composite of intermediate goods. The intermediate-goods industries 
are monopolistic for the producers owning a valid patent and become competitive once the patent expires. 
The relative price between the monopolistic and competitive goods leads to the usual static distortionary 
effect that reduces the output of final goods. The markup in the monopolistic industries drives a wedge 
between the marginal product of capital and the rental price; consequently, it leads to an additional 
dynamic distortionary effect that causes the market equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital to 
deviate from the social optimum. To prevent the model from overestimating the social benefits of R&D 
and hence the extent of R&D underinvestment, the long-run TFP growth is assumed to be driven by R&D 
as well as an exogenous process as in Comin (2004). In addition, this class of first-generation R&D-
                                                 
5
 All the studies cited here are based on European data. In the US, patent maintenance fees were not initiated until 
1982, and the fees are due 3.5 years ($900), 7.5 years ($2300) and 11.5 years ($3800) after a patent is granted, rather 
than annually as in some European countries.   
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driven endogenous growth models exhibits scale effects and is inconsistent with the empirical evidence in 
Jones (1995a).6 In the present model, scale effects are eliminated as in Jones (1995b). After eliminating 
scale effects, the resulting model becomes a semi-endogenous growth model, in which the balanced-
growth rate is proportional to the exogenous population growth rate.  
 The various components of the model are presented in Sections 2.1–2.8, and the competitive 
equilibrium is defined in Section 2.9. Section 2.10 derives the socially optimal allocations, and Section 
2.11 derives the dynamic distortionary effect of the patent length on capital accumulation. The analysis 
focuses on the balanced-growth path. 
 
2.1. Representative Household 
There is a representative household whose lifetime utility is given by  
(1) dtceU ttn
σ
σ
ρ
−
=
−
∞
−−
∫ 1
1
0
)(
, 
where 1≥σ  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ρ  is the exogenous 
subjective discount rate. The household has tnt eL .=  members at time t, and 0>n  is the constant 
exogenous population growth rate. ρ  is assumed to be greater than n  to ensure that utility is bounded. 
tc  is the per capita consumption of final goods (the numeraire). The household maximizes utility subject 
to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) ttttt cwanra −+−= )(& . 
Each member of the household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period to earn 
a wage income tw . ta  is the amount of financial assets, which consist of physical capital and patents, 
owned by each member of the household, and tr  is the real rate of return on these financial assets. From 
the household’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is  
                                                 
6
 See Jones (1999) for an excellent theoretical analysis on scale effects. 
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(3) σρ /)(/ −= ttt rcc& .  
Along the balanced growth path, tc  increases at a constant rate cg . Therefore, the equilibrium real 
interest rate along the balanced-growth path is  
(4) σρ cgr += . 
 
2.2. Final Goods  
The sector producing the final goods is characterized by perfect competition, and the producers take both 
the output price and input prices as given. In particular, the final-goods production function is  
(5) 
η
αηαα
/1
0
1
,
1 )( 






= ∫
−−
tV
ttytt djjXLZY   
for )/1,0(
.
αη ∈ . tY  is the amount of final goods produced. )exp(0 tgZZ Zt =  represents an exogenous 
process of productivity improvement that is freely available to all final-goods producers. tyL ,  is the 
number of production workers. )( jX t  is the amount of intermediate goods of variety ],0[ tVj ∈ , in 
which tV  is the number of varieties that has been invented as of time t. The production function in (5) 
nests Romer (1990) as a special case with 1=η  and 1=tZ  for all t. For 1=η , the monopoly markup 
µ  is restricted to be α/1  (i.e. roughly the inverse of the capital share); therefore, Jones and Williams 
(2000) propose a more realistic specification that allows η  to differ from one so that the markup is given 
by )/(1 αηµ =  in order to relax the parameter restriction between the markup and the capital share.  
 The final-goods producers take α−1tZ  as given. The current paper includes this exogenous TFP 
process for two reasons: (a) to avoids the mistake in assuming that the long-run TFP growth in the data is 
solely driven by R&D; and (b) to relax the restriction between the patent-value depreciation rate and the 
long-run TFP growth rate denoted by TFPg . This restriction will be discussed in details in Section 2.9. In 
short, by setting 0=zg  (i.e. by assuming that the long-run TFP growth is solely driven by R&D), the 
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balanced-growth rate of the number of varieties Vg  is pinned down by the TFP growth rate TFPg , the 
capital share α , and the markup )/(1 αη . Once Vg  is determined, the patent-value depreciation rate is 
also uniquely pinned down, and the calibration results suggest that this implied patent-value depreciation 
rate differs substantially from the previous empirical estimates based on patent renewal data. Therefore, 
the current paper adopts the specification in (5) that allows zg  to differ from zero in order to bring in the 
empirical estimates for the patent-value depreciation rate and perform a more realistic calibration.  
Profit maximization yields the first-order conditions for the wage rate and the price of 
intermediate-goods )( jPt  for ],0[ tVj ∈  given by  
(6) tytt LYw ,/)1( α−= , 
(7) )()()( 1
/)1(
0
1
,
1
.
jXdjjXLZjP t
V
ttytt
t
−
−
−−








= ∫
αη
ηη
αηααα  . 
 
2.3. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries, indexed by ],0[ tVj ∈ , producing the differentiated intermediate 
goods )( jX t . Once a variety has been invented, the production function in industry j  is  
(8) )()(
,
jKjX tyt = . 
)(
,
jK ty  is the amount of capital employed by industry j . The profit function facing the producer(s) of 
variety j  is  
(9) )()()()(
,
jKRjXjPj tytttt −=pi . 
tR  is the rental price of capital. Denote the steady-state fraction of monopolistic industries by .ω , which 
is endogenously determined by the patent length T. Without loss of generality, the industries are ordered 
such that industries ],0[
. tVj ω∈  are protected by patents and industries ],( . tt VVj ω∈′  are not protected 
by patents. Then, the first-order conditions are 
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(10) αη/)( tt RjP =   
for ],0[
. tVj ω∈ , and  
(11) tt RjP =′)(   
for ],(
. tt VVj ω∈′ . 
 
2.4. Aggregate Production Function and Static Distortion 
The total amount of capital employed by the intermediate-goods sector at time t  is  
(12) ))()1()(()(
.
0
,
jXjXVdjjXK ttt
V
tty
t
′−+== ∫ ωω . 
 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(13) ααααω tytyttt KLZAY ,1 ,11.~ −−−= , 
where tA  is the level of R&D-driven TFP and is defined as 
(14) ηαηα /)1(1 −− ≡ tt VA , 
and 
.
~ω  is defined as 
(15) 
ααη
ηαηαη
ωαηω
ωαηω
ω )1)((
)1)((
~
)1/(1
/1)1/(
−+
−+
≡
−
−
. 
.
~ω  is strictly less than one for )1,0(
.
∈ω  and equals one for }1,0{
.
∈ω . In addition, 0/~ <∂∂ ωω  when 
1)(1)(1
1
1
1
)1/()1/(1 <





−
−
−−
≡<
−− αηαηαη αη
αη
αηαη
ωω .  
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
.
~ω  captures the usual static distortionary effect of patent protection in creating a monopolistic markup in 
the patent-protected industries. In other words, the markup in the monopolistic industries distorts 
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production towards the competitive industries and thus reduces the total output of the final goods. 
Increasing the fraction of monopolistic industries worsens this static distortionary effect when 
..
ωω < . 
This static distortionary effect is not monotonic in the patent length because at an infinite patent length, 
all industries are monopolistic and the relative-price distortion disappears. 
 
2.5. National Income Account Identities 
The market-clearing condition for the final goods is  
(16) ttt ICY += . 
ttt cLC =  is aggregate consumption, and tI  is investment in physical capital. The correct value of gross 
domestic product (GDP) should include the amount of investment in R&D such that  
(17) trttrttt KRLwYGDP ,, ++= .7 
trL ,  and trK ,  are respectively the number of workers and the amount of capital in the R&D sector that 
invents new varieties. The amount of monopolistic profits, the factor payments for production workers 
and capital in the intermediate-goods sector are given by  
(18) ttyt YLw )1(, α−= , 
(19) ωα ˆ
, ttyt YKR = , 
(20) )ˆ1( ωαωpi −= ttt YV , 
where ]1,[ˆ
.
αηω ∈  is determined by the fraction of monopolistic industries 
.
ω  and is defined as  
(21) 
ωαηω
ωαηω
ω
αηαη
αη
−+
−+
≡
−
−
1)(
1)(
ˆ )1/(
)1/(1
. 
                                                 
7
 In the national income account, private spending in R&D is treated as an expenditure on intermediate goods. 
Therefore, the values of capital investment and GDP in the data are 
t
I  and 
t
Y  respectively. The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and the National Science Foundation’s R&D satellite account provides preliminary estimates on 
the effects of including R&D as an intangible asset in the national income accounts.  
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A rise in the fraction of monopolistic industries 
.
ω  leads to a decrease in ωˆ  and consequently, increases 
the wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental price. As will be shown below, this 
decrease in ωˆ  also leads to a lower rate of investment in physical capital. Therefore, ωˆ  captures the 
dynamic distortionary effect of the patent length on capital accumulation. 
 
2.6. Capital Accumulation 
The market-clearing condition for physical capital is  
(22) trtyt KKK ,, += .  
tK  is the total amount of capital available in the economy at time t. The law of motion for capital is  
(23) δttt KIK −=&   
δ  is the rate of depreciation. Denote the balanced-growth rate of capital by Kg , the endogenous steady-
state investment rate is  
(24) ttK YKgi /)( δ+=   
for all t. The no-arbitrage condition δ−= tt Rr  implies that the steady-state capital-output ratio is  
(25) ))(1(
ˆ
.
δσρ
ωα
++−
=
cKt
t
gsY
K
.  
Ks  is the endogenous steady-state R&D share of capital. Substituting (25) into (24) yields 
(26) 





++
+
−
= δσρ
δωα
c
K
K g
g
s
i
1
ˆ
.  
In the Romer model, (skilled) labor is the only input for R&D (i.e. 0=Ks ); therefore, the distortionary 
effect of patent length on the rate of investment in capital is unambiguously negative (i.e. 0/ <∂∂ Ti ). In 
the current model with 0≥Ks , there is an opposing positive effect operating through Ks . Intuitively, an 
increase in the patent length raises the private return on R&D and hence the share of capital employed in 
the R&D sector. Proposition 1 in Section 2.11 shows that the negative effect still dominates. 
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2.7. R&D 
The no-arbitrage value of a patent trP ,  for a new variety invented at time t is the expected present value 
of the stream of monopolistic profits earned by an R&D entrepreneur until the patent expires given by 
(27) t
Tt
t
tr
tr TdeP piτpiτ
τ )()(
,
Ω== ∫
+
−−
. 
pi
σρ
σρ
pi
gg
eT
c
Tggc
−+
−
≡Ω
−+− )(1)(  is the present-value discount factor after substituting in (4) for the steady-state 
real interest rate and defining pig  as the balanced-growth rate of monopolistic profits. When 0=pig , the 
market value of a patent depreciates approximately at an annual rate of 1/T.8 For example, when the 
patent length is 20 years and 0=pig , the market value of a patent depreciates at roughly 5% per year. 
However, the empirical estimates from the patent renewal data suggest that a reasonable range for the 
patent-value depreciation rates is between 15% and 25%; therefore, ]1.0,2.0[ −−∈pig . In other words, an 
invention loses about 10% to 20% of its market share per year on average. The marginal effect of patent 
length on )(TΩ  given by TggceT )()( piσρ −+−=Ω′  is positive, and this marginal effect depends positively 
on the profit growth rate pig . Therefore, a highly negative profit growth rate (i.e. a high patent-value 
depreciation rate) would render patent extension ineffective in raising the market value of patents. 
 The instantaneous probability )(ktλ  of an innovation success for R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈k  is  
(28) )()()(
,
1
,
kKkLk trtrtt
ββϕλ −= , 
where tϕ  is the productivity parameter of R&D inputs that the entrepreneurs take as given. This 
specification nests the “knowledge-driven” specification in Romer (1990) as a special case with 0=β  
and the “lab equipment” specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones and Williams (2000) 
                                                 
8
 This approximation is exact when the interest rate is zero.  
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as a special case with αβ = . The R&D sector is characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition. The amount of expected profit of investing in R&D is  
(29) )()()()(
,,,,
kKRkLwkPk trttrtttrtr −−= λpi . 
The first-order conditions for R&D entrepreneur k are  
(30) ttrtrttr wkLkKP =− βϕβ ))(/)(()1( ,,, ,  
(31) ttrtrttr RkLkKP =−1,,, ))(/)((. βϕβ .  
(30) and (31) together with (18) and (19) determine the resource allocation between production and R&D. 
 
2.8. Law of Motion for the Number of Varieties  
To eliminate scale effects and to ensure the existence of a balanced-growth path in the presence of 
population growth, I follow Jones and Williams (2000) to assume that the R&D productivity parameter 
tϕ  is a function of tV  given by 
(32) 11
,,
)(
.
−−
=
γββφϕϕ trtrtt LKV . 
)1,(−∞∈φ  captures the externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers,9 and ]1,0(∈γ  captures the 
negative externality in intratemporal duplication or the so-called “stepping-on-toes” effects. The law of 
motion for the number of varieties is  
(33) γββφββ ϕϕλ )()( 1
,,
1
,,
1
0
.
−−
=== ∫ trtrttrtrttt LKVLKdkkV& . 
Along the balanced-growth path, ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dkkKK trtr  increases at Kg , and ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dkkLL trtr  increases 
at the exogenous population growth rate n . Therefore, the balanced-growth rate of tV  denoted by Vg  is  
                                                 
9
 As discussed in Jones (1995b), )1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing-on-shoulder” effect, in which R&D 
productivity increases as tV  increases, and )0,(−∞∈φ  refers to the “fishing-out” effect, in which R&D productivity 
decreases as tV  increases.  
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(34) ng
V
LK
V
Vg K
t
trtr
t
t
V 





−
−
+





−
==≡
−
−
φ
βγ
φ
βγϕ φ
γββ
1
)1(
1
)(
..
1
1
,,
&
. 
Finally, the steady-state fraction of patented varieties 
.
ω  is given by  
(35) Tg
t
Ttt
t
t Ve
V
VV
V
V
−
−
−=
−
=≡ 1
~
&
&&
ω , 
where tV
~
 is the number of patented varieties at time t and Ttt VV −− &&  is the net increase in the number of 
patented varieties at time t.  
 
2.9. Decentralized Equilibrium and Balanced-Growth Path 
The analysis starts at 0=t  when the economy has reached the balanced-growth path corresponding to 
the patent length T. The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞
=0, }),(,,,{ ttrtttt PjPRrw  and a sequence of 
allocations ∞
=0,,,, },,,,,,,),(,,{ ttttrtrtytyttttt LKLKLKIYjXac  that are consistent with initial conditions 
},,,,,{ 000000 ϕAVZLK  and their subsequent laws of motions. Also, in each period,  
(a) the representative household chooses },{ tt ac  to maximize utility taking },{ tt rw  as given;  
(b) the competitive firms in the final-goods sector choose }),({
,tyt LjX  to maximize profits 
according to the production function taking }),({ tt wjP  as given; 
(c) the monopolistic firms ],0[
. tVj ω∈  in the intermediate-goods sector choose )}(),({ , jKjP tyt  to 
maximize profits according to the demand curve from the final-goods sector and the production 
function taking }{ tR  as given;  
(d) the competitive firms ]1,(
.
ω∈′j  in the intermediate-goods sector choose )}({
,
jK ty ′  to 
maximize profits according to the production function taking }),({ tt RjP ′  as given;  
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(e) the entrepreneurs ]1,0[∈k  in the R&D sector choose )}(),({
,,
kKkL trtr  to maximize profits 
according to the production function taking },,,{
, ttrtt PRw ϕ  as given;  
(f) the market for the final goods clears such that ttt ICY += ; 
(g) the full employment of capital such that trtyt KKK ,, += ; and 
(h) the full employment of labors such that trtyt LLL ,, += . 
 
 Equating the first-order conditions (18) and (30) and imposing the balanced-growth condition  
(36) 
V
trtrt
t g
LK
V
ββϕ −
=
1
,,
  
yield the steady-state shares of labor inputs given by  
(37) 
ω
ωα
σρα
β
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σρ pi )ˆ1()1(
1
1
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−
−
−
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−
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ge
s
s
c
V
Tgg
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c
. 
Similarly, equating (19) and (31) and imposing (36) yield the steady-state shares of capital inputs as 
(38) 
ω
ωα
σρα
β
pi
σρ pi )ˆ1()1(
1
)(
−
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

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
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. 
The balanced-growth rates of various variables are given as follows. From the aggregate 
production function in (13) and the steady-state investment rate in (26),   
(39) ngggggg ZACIKY ++==== . 
Therefore, ZAc ggg += . From the definition of R&D-driven TFP in (14),   
(40) VA gg 




 −
−
=
η
αη
α
1
1
1
. 
Finally, from (20), the balanced-growth rate of monopolistic profits is  
(41) VZAVY gnggggg −++=−=pi . 
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Note that pig  is restricted to equal 0>+ ngZ  when 1=η  because VA gg = . However, when η  is 
large (i.e. a low markup), Vg  becomes large relative to Ag . Therefore, holding Ag  constant, an increase 
in η  leads to a decrease in pig . Eventually, pig  becomes negative for a low enough markup.  
Denote the fraction of the long-run TFP driven by R&D by ξ  such that )1/(
.
αξ −= TFPA gg  and 
)1/()1( αξ −−= TFPZ gg . If 1=ξ , then the value of pig  is pinned down by Ag , α , η  and n  
according to (40) and (41). The resulting implied value of pig  could be seriously biased due to the 
misspecification of the model. Therefore, I allow ξ  to differ from one and calibrate this parameter from 
the data. Firstly, I make use of the previous empirical estimates for the patent-value depreciation rate to 
determines pig . Note that once pig  is given, (41) pins down a unique value for Vg  for given values of 
TFPg , α  and n . Then, given Vg , (40) pins down a unique value  for Ag  for given values of α  and η .  
Finally, from (34) and using (39) and (40), the balanced-growth condition that determines the 
externality parameters γ  and φ  is given by  
(42) )(1
1
1
.
1
ngg ZV +










 −
−
−
−
=
−
β
η
αη
α
β
γ
φ
. 
 
2.10. Socially Optimal Allocations 
To derive the socially optimal rate of capital investment *i  and R&D shares of labor *Ls  and capital 
*
Ks , 
the social planner maximizes  
(43) ∫
∞
−
−−
−
−
=
0
1
)(
1
)/)1(( dtLYieU ttttn
σ
σ
ρ
 
subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(44) αααααηαη −−−− −−= 11
,,
1/)1( )1()1( tttLtKttt LKssZVY ; 
(b) the law of motion for capital expressed in terms of ti  given by 
 - 16 - 
(45) δtttt KYiK −=& ;  
and (c) the law of motion for the number of varieties expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
(46) ϕγββγγββγφ )1()1(
,,
)()( −−= tttLtKtt LKssVV& . 
After deriving the first-order conditions, the social planner solves for *i , *Ls  and 
*
Ks  on the balanced-
growth path.  
 
Lemma 2: The socially optimal rate of capital investment *i  is  
(47) δσρ
δ
φσρ
γ
η
αηβα
++
+
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



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K
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V
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g
ggn
gi )1()1(
1
.
*
, 
and the socially optimal R&D shares of labor *Ls  and capital *Ks  are respectively 
(48)  
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Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
(48) and (49) indicate the various R&D externalities: (a) the negative externality in intratemporal 
duplication ]1,0(∈γ ; (b) the positive or negative externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers 
)1,(−∞∈φ ; (c) the positive externality from the dynamic surplus-appropriability problem due to a finite 
patent length given by 1)1( ))1(( <− +−+−− Tggn Vce σρ ; and finally, (d) the positive externality from the static 
surplus-appropriability problem given by ωωαηαη /)ˆ1(/)1( −>−  for all T. Given the existence of 
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positive and negative externalities, it requires a careful calibration that will be performed in Section 3 to 
determine whether the market economy over- or under-invests in R&D.  
 
2.11. Dynamic Distortion 
If the market economy underinvests in R&D, the government may want to increase the patent length to 
reduce the extent of this market failure. However, an increase in T would worsen the dynamic 
distortionary effect on capital accumulation. Therefore, the government needs to trade off the gains from 
the increase in R&D and the losses caused by the dynamic distortion and potentially the static distortion. 
Proposition 1 provides the condition under which the markup-pricing distortion moves the market 
equilibrium rate of capital investment i  away from the social optimum *i . 
 
Proposition 1: The decentralized equilibrium capital investment rate i  is below the socially optimal 
investment rate *i  if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor input for R&D. In 
addition, an increase in the patent length always reduces the equilibrium capital investment rate i . 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
The second part of the proposition is quite intuitive. When the patent length increases, the fraction of 
monopolistic industries rises. The resulting higher aggregate markup drives a bigger wedge between the 
marginal product of capital and the rental price. Therefore, the market equilibrium rate of investment in 
physical capital decreases. As for the first part of the proposition, the discrepancy between the market 
equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital and the social optimum arises because of: (a) the 
aggregate markup; and (b) the discrepancy between the market equilibrium R&D capital share Ks  and the 
socially optimal R&D capital share *Ks . Since the market equilibrium capital investment rate i  is an 
increasing function of Ks , the underinvestment in R&D in the market equilibrium is sufficient for 
*ii < . 
On the other hand, when there is overinvestment in R&D in the market equilibrium, whether i  is below 
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or above *i  depends on whether the effect of the aggregate markup or the effect of R&D overinvestment 
dominates. For the case in which labor is the only factor input for R&D, 0=Ks ; therefore, only the 
effect of the aggregate markup is present.  
 
3. Calibration 
This section firstly calibrates the structural and externality parameters using long-run aggregate data of 
the US economy and then computes the changes in R&D and consumption from varying the patent 
length. After that, the dynamic distortionary effects are also examined.  
 
3.1. Structural Parameters 
The statutory patent length T in the US is 20 years, and the average annual labor-force growth rate n  is 
1.66%.10 The annual discount rate ρ  and the annual rate of depreciation δ  for physical capital are set to 
conventional values of 0.04 and 0.08 respectively. β  is set equal to α  corresponding to the lab-
equipment specification in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Jones and Williams (2000).11 Once the 
above parameters are determined, the model provides five steady-state conditions (summarized in (50)-
(54) below) to match the following five moments in the data and to determine the remaining five 
structural parameters },,,,{ ξηασ Vg . The ratio of private investment to GDP is 20.21%,12 and the labor 
share of total income is set to a conventional value of 0.7. The ratio of private spending on R&D to GDP 
is 1.49%.13, and the average annual TFP growth rate ))(1( ZATFP ggg +−= α  is 1.02%.14  As discussed 
                                                 
10
 This number is calculated using data between 1956 and 2006 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
11
 I have considered different plausible values for }3,2,,0{ αααβ ∈  as a sensitivity analysis, and the results are 
robust to these parameter changes. 
12
 This number is calculated using data between 1956 and 2006 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and GDP is 
net of government spending.  
13
 This number is calculated using data between 1956 and 2004 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
National Science Foundation. R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending.  
14
 Multifactor productivity for private non-farm business sector from the Bureau of Labor Statistics is available from 
1956 to 2002.  
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in Section 2.7, the empirical estimates based on the patent renewal data suggest that a reasonable range 
for the patent-value depreciation rates is between 15% and 25%; therefore, ]1.0,2.0[ −−∈pig .  
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(54) VTFP gngg −+−= )1/( αpi . 
For βα = , the R&D share of labor and capital is 
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Table 1 lists the calibrated structural parameters along with the implied markup )/(1 αηµ =  and 
the implied real interest rate σρ Agr += .  
gpi σ α η ξ gV µ r
-0.10 2.872 0.310 2.970 0.338 0.131 1.085 0.082
-0.15 2.907 0.310 3.008 0.391 0.181 1.071 0.083
-0.20 2.933 0.310 3.024 0.458 0.231 1.065 0.083
Table 1: Calibrated Structural Parameters
 
The implied markup is within the empirically plausible range. For example, Laitner and Stolyarov’s 
(2004) estimated markup is 1.09-1.11, and Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate that the aggregate profit 
share in the US is about 3%.15 Also, the implied real interest rate is closed to the historical rate of return in 
the US stock market. The calibrated values for ξ  suggest that roughly 35% to 45% of the long-run TFP 
growth in the US is driven by R&D.  
                                                 
15
 Assuming cost minimization, the return to scale = markup x (1 - the profit share). Basu and Fernald’s (1997) 
estimates also suggest that “a typical industry has roughly constant returns to scale.” (p. 250) 
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3.2. Externality Parameters 
For each set of the calibrated parameters, the balanced-growth condition in (42) determines a unique 
value for )1/( φγ − , which is sufficient to determine the effect of R&D on the balanced-growth level of 
consumption. However, holding )1/( φγ −  constant, a larger γ  implies a faster rate of convergence to the 
balanced-growth path; therefore, it is important to consider different values for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  that is the 
parameter for the negative externality in intratemporal duplication. The calibrated values for φ  that is the 
parameter for the externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers are listed in Table 2, and the positive 
values suggest positive knowledge spillovers (i.e. the standing-on-shoulder effect). 
gpi / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.10 0.984 0.968 0.952 0.935 0.919 0.903 0.887 0.871 0.855 0.839
-0.15 0.988 0.977 0.965 0.953 0.942 0.930 0.918 0.907 0.895 0.883
-0.20 0.991 0.982 0.973 0.963 0.954 0.945 0.936 0.927 0.918 0.908
Table 2: The Implied Values for ϕ
 
 
3.3. Socially Optimal R&D 
This section computes the socially optimal level of R&D share )1/()1/()1( ****
. KKLL ssss −+−− αα . 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows that there is underinvestment in R&D unless γ  is very small. To reduce the plausible 
parameter space for γ , I make use of the empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D. 
Following Jones and Williams’ (1998) derivation, Appendix II shows that the net social rate of return r~  
can be expressed as 
(55) 111
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Holding other things constant, r~  is increasing in γ . Table 3 shows that for the range of values for 
2.0≤γ  that exhibits R&D underinvestment, the implied social rates of return r~  are less than 8%, which 
are far below the empirical estimates summarized in Jones and Williams (1998).  
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gpi / γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.10 5.0% 7.0% 8.9% 10.8% 12.7% 14.6% 16.5% 18.4% 20.3% 22.2%
-0.15 5.3% 7.4% 9.6% 11.7% 13.9% 16.0% 18.1% 20.3% 22.4% 24.6%
-0.20 5.6% 8.0% 10.5% 12.9% 15.3% 17.8% 20.2% 22.7% 25.1% 27.5%
Table 3: The Implied Social Rates of Return to R&D
  
Since the empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D vary across studies, I will leave it to the 
readers to decide on their preferred values. For the relevant range of γ , there is underinvestment in R&D. 
This finding of R&D underinvestment is due to the calibration result that a non-negligible fraction of 
long-run TFP growth is driven by R&D. In other words, if the calibrated values for ξ  were smaller, then 
the socially optimal levels of R&D spending would be lower. This is because a lower calibrated value for 
ξ  implies a lower calibrated value for )1/( φγ − , which in turn implies that R&D would have a smaller 
effect on consumption. 
 
3.4. Patent Extension 
Given the above finding of R&D underinvestment, a natural question to ask is whether extending the 
patent length can effectively mitigate this problem. Figure 2 shows that the magnitude of the increases in 
R&D from extending the patent length beyond 20 years depends on the patent-value depreciation rate.  
[insert Figure 2 here] 
At a high patent-value depreciation rate, the stimulating effect of the patent length on R&D is almost 
negligible. At a low patent-value depreciation rate, extending the patent length from 20 to 50 years 
increases R&D slightly by 0.2 percentage points, and the resulting level of R&D is still far below the 
social optimum. Therefore, this numerical exercise suggests that patent extension is not an effective 
method in stimulating R&D confirming the intuition discussed in Section 2.7. On the other hand, 
shortening the patent length can reduce R&D spending significantly. 
 The next exercise computes the percentage changes in long-run consumption when the patent 
length varies from 20 years.  
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Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-growth 
path is  
(56) 
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Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
Figure 3 plots the percentage changes in long-run consumption.  
[insert Figure 3 here] 
Given the small increases in R&D from patent extension, the positive effect on long-run consumption is 
no more than 3% at the lower bound of the patent-value depreciation rates and is as small as 0.61% at the 
upper bound. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the increase in consumption mostly comes 
from )(ln)1()1)(1(
)1( Tsr∆
−−−−
−
αηγααφη
αηγ
 that is the direct effect of increasing R&D spending on 
consumption. In other words, the other general-equilibrium and distortionary effects only have secondary 
impacts. 
 
3.5. Dynamic Distortion 
Proposition 1 derives the sufficient condition under which the market equilibrium rate of investment in 
physical capital is below the socially optimal level in (47). The next numerical exercise quantifies this 
discrepancy. Figure 4 presents the socially optimal rates of investment in physical capital along with the 
US’s long-run investment rate, and the difference is about 1.7% on average.  
[insert Figure 4 here] 
The equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital is decreasing in the aggregate markup; therefore, 
extending the patent length decreases the capital investment rate and causes it to deviate further from the 
social optimum. Figure 5 presents the equilibrium rates of capital investment at different patent length.  
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[insert Figure 5 here] 
Extending the patent length from 20 to 50 years would cause the steady-state equilibrium rate of 
investment in physical capital to decrease slightly by at most 0.24%.  
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper provides a quantitative framework to evaluate the effects of extending the patent length. At the 
empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to 
only a very small increase in R&D. Therefore, the policy implication is that the patent length is not an 
effective policy instrument in solving the R&D-underinvestment problem. Although the analysis focuses 
on the balanced-growth path, taking into consideration the transition dynamics should not alter this policy 
implication. This is because if the long-run effects on consumption are so small, accounting for the 
potential short-run consumption losses would make the overall welfare gains even more negligible. The 
calibration exercise also suggests that about 35% to 45% of the long-run TFP growth in the US is driven 
by R&D and extending the patent length would worsen the dynamic distortionary effect slightly by 
reducing the steady-state rate of investment in physical capital by at most 0.24%.  
The readers are advised to interpret the numerical results with some important caveats in mind. 
Although the variety-expanding growth model has been generalized to capture more realistic features of 
the US economy, it is still an oversimplification of the real world. Furthermore, the finding of R&D 
underinvestment is based on the assumptions that the empirical estimates for the social rate of return to 
R&D and the data on private R&D spending are not incorrectly measured by an order of magnitude. The 
validity of these assumptions remains as an empirical question. Therefore, the numerical results should be 
viewed as illustrative at best. 
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Appendix I: Proofs 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(a1) ααααω tytyttt KLZAY ,1 ,11.~ −−−= , 
where tA  is the level of R&D-driven TFP and is defined as 
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Proof: (7), (10) and (11) imply that )()()( )1/(1 jXjX tt ′= −αηαη . Substituting this condition into (12) 
and then the resulting condition into (5) yields the aggregate production function. For }1,0{
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Lemma 2: The socially optimal rate of capital investment *i  is  
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Proof: To derive the socially optimal rate of capital investment and R&D shares of labor and capital, the 
social planner chooses ti , tLs ,  and tKs ,  to maximize  
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∞
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subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
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1/)1( )1()1( tttLtKttt LKssZVY ; 
(b) the law of motion for capital expressed in terms of ti  given by 
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and (c) the law of motion for R&D technology expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
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The current-value Hamiltonian H  is  
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Note that the first-order conditions with respect to the co-state variables tK ,υ  and tV ,υ  yield the laws of 
motion for capital and the number of varieties. Then, imposing the balanced-growth conditions yields 
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Finally, solving (b14)-(b18) yields (b1)-(b3).■  
 
Proposition 1: The decentralized equilibrium capital investment rate i  is below the socially optimal 
investment rate *i  if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor input for R&D. In 
addition, an increase in the patent length always reduces the equilibrium capital investment rate i . 
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Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-growth 
path is  
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Proof: The following derivation applies to the more general case in which α  and β  can be different. 
Along the balanced growth path, per capita consumption is  
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The balanced-growth path of tV  from (46) is  
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Therefore, the balanced-growth path of tA  from (c4) and (14) is  
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Finally, substituting (c3) and (c5) into (c2) and dropping the exogenous terms yield the expression for the 
balanced-growth level of per capita consumption corresponding to the patent length T given by 
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Finally, after setting βα = , (c6) becomes (c1).  
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Appendix II: The Social Rate of Return to R&D 
Jones and Williams (1998) define the social rate of return as the sum of the additional output produced 
and the reduction in R&D that is made possible by reallocating one unit of output from consumption to 
R&D in the current period and then reducing R&D in the next period to leave the subsequent path of 
technology unchanged. I rewrite the law of motion for R&D technology as  
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,, trtrt LKR . The aggregate production function is rewritten as  
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Using the above definition, Jones and Williams (1998) show that the gross social return is   
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After imposing the balanced-growth conditions, the net social return becomes  
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Appendix III: Figures 
Figure 1: Socially Optimal R&D Shares
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Figure 2: R&D Shares at Different Patent Length
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Figure 3: Percentage Changes in Long-Run Consumption
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Figure 4: Socially Optimal Rates of Investment in Physical Capital
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Rates of Investment in Physical Capital at Different Patent Length
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